The warning signs of the conflict - The role of Italy - "non-belligerency" and intervention - a series of disasters - the last unexploited opportunities Victory - The conflict widens - The inevitable end - a tragic result of political compromise.
Piero Sella
This is not new that history is written by the victors in the bulk and that the memorials are autoescusatori Chiefs defeated. In them is reconstructed on the basis of what today richiede; i fatti più discutibili vengono addebitati a collaboratori defunti o ad ordini superiori, anche se di ciò non esiste alcuna valida documentazione. Interessate distorsioni influiscono quindi su un serio accertamento storico dei fatti e delle intenzioni che li mossero. A distanza di 40 anni, non è ancora possibile, di conseguenza, a chi pur le visse, ai giovani, agli appassionati della storia, farsi un’idea obiettiva degli eventi a cavallo degli anni 1940 che travolsero il nostro paese e lo condussero con l’Europa alla situazione attuale.
Sotto l’influenza delle potenze extraeuropee vincitrici, quelle che a Yalta si spartirono l’Europa, dei politici e degli uomini di cultura ad esse related, it has been natural to consider, as advantageous, the situation of colonial protectorate in which Europe found itself after the war, presenting as a lucky event that things had been different, because otherwise Germany
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The cultural pressure needed to gain acceptance as the best possible outcome that the conflict was, could not come loose even at a great distance of time, indeed, because due to the natural, logical flow of the history of peoples and of changes in the balance of power international political aspect of the EU risks seem increasingly illogical, it was decided to scale further la mano.
Per far accettare la jattura delle truppe sovietiche a Berlino, Praga, Budapest e la sudditanza dell’Europa Occidentale agli USA, è evidente la necessità di contrapporvi un’ipotesi ancora peggiore.
C’è però una differenza tra quel che viviamo e “l’ipotesi peggiore”, ed essa sta nel fatto che l’imperialismo comunista e quello economico-culturale degli USA, sono una triste realtà, così come i regimi da loro imposti, mentre quel che sarebbe accaduto all’Europa se comunismo e democrazie fossero risultate soccombenti è ipotesi tutta da dimostrare. E’ certo comunque che, in quest’ultimo caso, qualsiasi decisione our future would have been entrusted to us Europeans.
Nobody else is able to show that Germany had ambitions in the west or south, and that its territorial ambitions were boundless. When the war it had a 600,000 sq km of territory against 40 million for only the British Empire! These simple ideas from which the Europeans have kept away, because of the anesthetic effects of defeat are not yet disposed of. They should give up thinking of ways and at the time of rebirth and content, those beyond the Iron Curtain, to live under communism, we on this side, to accept the dismissal of the perpetual modello di vita che dalla sconfitta ci è stato imposto.
Ma se il regime che stiamo subendo è un male, è male anche la sconfitta che gli ha permesso di installarsi parassitariamente sulle nostre carni. Vogliamo uscire dal labirinto senza uscita della storiografia quale ci viene suggerita dai vincitori, verificare la fondatezza di quel che è dai più ritenuta opinione intangibile, capire quanto e da chi siamo stati ingannati.
E’ d’uso che dopo una guerra persa, ogni nazione indaghi sulle cause della sconfitta, cerchi di capire se è stato fatto tutto quanto poteva essere fatto per vincere. Si esaminano a fondo il momento storico, il perché del conflitto, il comportamento dei capi politici e militari; non di rado si giunge a processarli per gli errori dolosi o colposi del loro operare.
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Per l’Europa e per l’Italia, il conflitto 1940-1945, a questo proposito è stato un caso del tutto anomalo. Sparito per debellatio il regime fascista sconfitto, quello subentrato, la democrazia, senza fornire di ciò alcuna motivata analisi, molto difficile del resto perché tutta basata su quanto non è accaduto, dà per scontato che il perdere la guerra sia coinciso con il bene della Nazione.
Essa non pensa affatto di rinfacciare “a quelli di prima” responsabilità inerenti al fatto di aver portato il paese alla sconfitta, anzi, in cuor suo, li li benedice come strumento necessario al proprio riemergere.
Il convinto democratico si è finora rifiutato di approfondire in tal senso l’argomento. Il farlo lo avrebbe predisposto ad aprire il suo inconscio ad inconfessabili dubbi, a vaghe misteriose paure, a dover ammettere, una volta constatata l’erroneità, il debole riparo dogmatico della premessa, e di aver sbagliato tutto.
Postwar trials against political and military were so all marked by the logic of Vae Victis, and followed the path shown by legal farce of Nuremberg.
The official history of anti-Italian, in its two strands, communist and democratic, he resigned to impeach the most serious shortcomings of the fascist leadership, those that cost the country's defeat, stopping instead on the more superficial and demagogues them: the quality of certain weapons, the "shoe box" anti-fascists pretended, with cynical demagoguery, after schemers col nemico, di prendere le parti dei nostri soldati, che secondo loro avrebbero dovuto sì essere ben guidati, ben nutriti e ben armati, ma, per carità di patria, avrebbero comunque dovuto perdere.
Si cercò di gettare il ridicolo, con un’analisi parziale, subdolamente limitata, su tutta una serie di scelte politiche, culturali, storiche, sulle quali l’antifascismo uscì vincente, non per propria superiorità, ma per aver avuto, fuori dai confini (e questo già dovrebbe far riflettere) chi, per i propri interessi, lo sostenne.
L’unico merito della rediviva classe politica democratica, già estromessa dal potere negli anni 1920 dalla sua stessa incapacità, la stessa dalla quale, nuovamente, oggi siamo afflitti, fu cioè quello di aver puntato su vicende militari che ebbero per essa svolgimento fortunato.
Fu grandemente in ciò facilitata dalla scarsa omogeneità della dirigenza fascista, abbondando in essa, specie nelle forze armate e nella diplomazia, elementi infidi, legati agli ambienti massonici, internazionalisti, ammanicati con Londra e Parigi, che avevano il proprio punto di riferimento nella dinastia sabauda, proprio da tali ambienti messa sul trono d’Italia.
Il fascismo scontò, nel momento decisivo per sé e per la Nazione, i compromessi che da movimento l’avevano condotto a farsi regime, sottoposto a mille condizionamenti, progressively stripped of revolutionary potential. So that, having chosen the path of the alliance with the National Socialist Germany, did not conduct subsequent to that decision. When it was necessary to consider very seriously the time and the political consequences of the conflict, were so lightly put into play with the institutions that the nation had built twenty-year effort and the same political destinies of Europe. That the leadership of Italian political and military action during the conflict was detached, uncertain, short-sighted, steeped in petty bourgeois opportunism, who gathered for superficiality and dishonesty of conduct, contempt of enemies and allies.
Ma questi fatti, sui quali per la loro gravità torneremo, pur avendo avuto indubbia influenza sul risultato del conflitto, non autorizzano la storiografia antifascista a sostenere che l’esito di esso fosse scontato, né ad influenzare in tal senso la pubblica opinione, indirizzandone l’attenzione piuttosto su quelli che sono oggi i rapporti di forza nel mondo, anziché su quelli che erano all’epoca della guerra; a non distinguere modi e tempi della formazione degli schieramenti, ad affermare che, comunque, i fatti non potevano avere conclusione diversa da quella che ebbero. Da tale suo atteggiamento, risulta unicamente quanto essenziale, per il regime di cui si pone a difesa, è il fatto che le cose siano been channeled to "this" future.
No wonder that, starting from similar premises, have so far presented the warring parties manicheisticamente uniforms, hence the good, beyond the bad, and the atrocities of the Soviets and the Anglo-American terror bombing, places the service of "just cause", have been approved. The ideologization the conflict did not stop with the cessation of hostilities. Have continued, despite the facts that would lead to different conclusions, purely propagandistic versions, has insisted, as for so-called death camps, on misinformation that exceeded the value of time after previous wars, were dropped. Who has more courage to support, now that the Germans in World War I, had cut off the hands of children in Belgium?
Today, we are stubborn on purpose on a careful, defamatory "reconstruction" of the facts, intended to criminalize a party to the conflict, the one against which, ideologically, it is considered still at war. Continue the war that is beyond the reach of its most macroscopic military objectives is exploited for the way cultural success on the battlefield.
In such a design is to understand the advantage to tie the status of Fascist intention is to isolate it and make it difficult to spread ideas, to refuse to show anyone pseudologica faction, that is, aberrant, having to rejoice in the defeat of their country in war.
It is alleged and claimed that the masochistic attitude, simply because you could see in defeat the seeds of violent change of the political class in power.
We believe that the replacement of a political class with another should be a discussion within the nation and we must, however, refused the idea of \u200b\u200bany dispute policy with the help of foreign troops. It seems absurd to have
to speak words to convince you that political independence is the source of all freedom, that the interest of a nation at war is to win it, that to do otherwise is the worst crime of which can stain a citizen, but, unfortunately, the ' precede the particular to the general interest of the individual and the faction of society that is so in line with the model of life proposed by the ideologies of political parties, which many, ours are still questionable concepts.
Being able to make it seem acceptable to date position thus immoral, unnatural, demonstrates the level of ideological terrorism, how anti-national bias si siano dovute sopportare fino ad oggi.
Il nostro non è un gratuito maramaldeggiare contro una classe politica già abbastanza squalificata. L’antifascismo fu realmente su tali posizioni. Fin dall’agosto 1939, ricorda il ministro francese De Monzie “Sforza e i fuoriusciti antifascisti in Francia spingevano alla guerra contro l’Italia per potersi installare sulle rovine del fascismo e della Patria”. Persino un cervellone come Benedetto Croce, dimostra di perdersi in un bicchiere d’acqua quando ci racconta: “Noi ricercammo ansiosi la formazione dell’avvenire migliore d’Italia, non già nei successi del cosiddetto Asse, ma nei progressi lenti e faticosi dell’Inghilterra e poi della Russia e dell’America”.
Degno castigo per costoro il ritrovarsi in compagnia di figuri come Lucky Luciano, tirato fuori dalle prigioni di New York e rispedito in Italia a motivo degli “speciali motivi resi alle forze armate degli Stati Uniti”.
La cooperazione tra antifascismo, esercito USA, organizzazioni criminali americane e mafia è documentata fra l’altro dalla presenza in Sicilia e poi a Napoli a fianco del governatore Charles Poletti, del noto gangster Vito Genovese, amico di Calogero Vizzini e del notissimo mafioso democristiano Genco Russo, ambedue nominati sindaci dei loro paesi dai “liberatori” USA.
Ben lungi dal gioire per la sconfitta, è nostra intenzione ricercarne le cause, individuando, e non in superficie, le responsabilità, le decisioni, le scelte che portarono alla catastrofe, senza alcun riguardo per uomini e istituzioni del regime fascista che tali indagini indicassero colpevoli. Un atteggiamento di libertà questo che non vorremmo però minimamente confuso o strumentalizzato in senso antifascista, non essendo nostra intenzione etichettarci in tal senso, confonderci con chi si pose, al servizio della fazione, contro i propri fratelli in armi.
Ci pare evidente che i meriti di una indicazione politico-culturale nulla hanno a che vedere con le sorti militari di un conflitto ed in ogni caso gli errori degli uni non dimostrano affatto che gli altri were right. Mistakes remain strong heritage of those who committed them, and are not manageable, as in a sum to compensate those of the opponent. Indeed, in the case of Italy and those of anti-fascism errors accumulate to the detriment of the nation.
It seems possible today, the clarity of these premises, go to the root of events is less clear, grok and get a more accurate historical picture, in many ways different from what is accepted practice. Explain something more, it can perhaps increase the regret for how things could have been, and the bitterness of the circumstances in which combatants and people were chiamati a sacrificarsi, ma ci pare utile contributo alla ricerca di quella autonomia ed autentica indipendenza che l’Europa pare oggi nuovamente desiderare. Vogliamo chiarire questi punti:
- enormi furono gli errori della nostra dirigenza politica, per incapacità e gelosie personali; per confusione sulle prospettive storiche e per deficienze gravissime nel settore militare, specie per quanto attiene la sicurezza e l’organizzazione del comando supremo;
- gli antifascisti, e in essi comprendiamo gli indecisi, gli opportunisti, quegli stessi fascisti che erano ormai tali solo di nome (ricordiamo che molti degli stessi gerarchi non esitarono a dichiararsi apertamente filo inglesi), dettero il loro voluntary contributions because the war broke out and because Italy was defeated.
- because the war was lost politically and militarily, especially in terms of grand strategy did not work at all, or the Pact of Steel between Italy and Germany, or Japan and extended to the tripartite consultation mechanisms were provided on paper.
- is not true in all cases in which the fate of the war were marked in advance. The war, especially from the Italian side there was the grit necessary, could be won; Europe come out differently from that of today, much better quality of life. The defeat was a historical disaster of incalculable extent. This is demonstrated by the present state of our nation and the continent oppressed by powers outside Europe.
The warning signs of the conflict - the role of Italy
Everything seemed to spring from the German request to enter into negotiations with Poland to Gdansk for a link with their own territories of East Prussia, the Polish stubbornness in refusing, despite the universally recognized reasonableness of requests dell'interferire German and English and French, in favor of the Poles, with a guarantee without limit and that he had no prospect of being made operational. There was already
lo zampino USA, poiché il fallimento della politica del New Deal roosveltiano stava spingendo gli USA al bellicismo. Forrestal nel suo diario si vanta: “né i Francesi né gli Inglesiavrebbero fatto della Polonia una ragione di guerra se non fossero stati continuamente spronati da Washington”. L’ambasciatore statunitense a Parigi, Bullit, fanatica “spalla” di Roosevelt, si muoveva su tale direttrice; fu lui che spinse l’ambasciatore polacco a Parigi a rifiutare qualsiasi possibilità di accomodamento. Analoga politica seguirono gli ambasciatori USA a Londra e Varsavia. Documentazione di ciò fu rintracciata dai tedeschi a Varsavia e Parigi occupate e fu esibita a Norimberga dalla difesa di Ribbentrop.
U.S. pressures were exerted to establish the conditions for an encirclement against Germany. The rest were just the insistence of U.S. diplomacy to push the British and French to open negotiations for an alliance with Moscow. And 'what is symptomatic with this policy the U.S. would propose a Europe that which we now have, the less Europe European policies existed to date.
As offered by the British and French to make friends with the Soviets proved insufficient. The National competitors had obviously something more to offer: Poland. But the slow pace of negotiations allied with the Soviets and the memories of the French Foreign Minister Bonnet, fanno sorgere un sospetto aggiuntivo: che Inglesi e Francesi non vedessero poi così male una spartizione della Polonia tra Germania e URSS. Il risultato sarebbe stato una lunga frontiera in comune tra di esse, la possibilità cioè di completare concretamente l’accerchiamento del Reich!
L’accordo Ribbentrop-Molotov del 23 agosto 1939 tolse ogni dubbio ai dirigenti tedeschi sul fatto di trovarsi, nella vertenza con i Polacchi, in posizione di forza.
La neutralità dell’Unione Sovietica, che pochi giorni dopo, con la spartizione della Polonia, si sarebbe trasformata in aperta complicità con la Germania nazionalsocialista, aveva isolato in modo definitivo gli Anglo-Francesi, che rischiavano di trovarsi in guerra contro la Germania e l’Italia, legata ad essa dal patto d’acciaio (l’alinea 3 del quale prevedeva l’intervento automatico) in un contesto internazionale sfavorevolissimo e per questioni che tutto sommato le riguardavano molto marginalmente.
Ci pare quindi che il calcolo di Hitler e del suo ministro degli esteri di poter regolare le questioni in sospeso con la Polonia senza che la minaccia anglo-francese avesse concrete possibilità di realizzarsi, fosse tutto sommato logico.
Il problema dei rapporti tra Germania e Polonia, stava cioè per risolversi nel quadro della graduale, pacifica revisione del trattato di Versailles, che negli anni precedenti accommodate the issue had seen the Rhine, the Austrian and Sudeten case. The Germans had almost come to crown the unification under one banner all the people of Germanic language, placing them in line with historical tradition, a block to the East, against the entry in Slavic Europe. They also had given repeated assurances that it had no claim to the West to put on the table. "The state of the German army in 1939 was that" - says the British historian AJP Taylor - "Not to suggest that Hitler had in mind a general war and probably never thought of war." In fact, while in Germany the cost of the equipment were 30% of the state budget in 1939 were 50% those of England, and France spending even 60%!
capitalist democracies had acquired the belief that no power in the long run, stand comparison in terms of practical achievements and social solidarity, with the emerging totalitarian countries, poor in raw materials and territories, but full of arms and spirituality. The ideological hatred of trade was that they did nothing to block Poland, the arbiter of whether or not to drag them into war, a war which saw Germany defeat, but also had to adjust to an end the triumph of communism and the end of the European power .
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considered marginal to the Italian participation in the warning signs of the conflict, leaving perhaps fooled by the geographical position of Italy, too southern compared interweaving of notes, interviews, warranties, covenants, summer 1939 .
We think that in such events has been assigned to Italy less important than it was and we are deeply convinced that its role in causing the conflagration has been decisive.
ally informed of its decision to resolve the issue with the weapons of Gdansk, Germany was expected to complete full alignment with the Italian proprie posizioni. Ciò per quanto previsto dal patto d’acciaio, intesa riconfermata nei colloqui di Salisburgo del 11-12-13 agosto fra Hitler, Ciano, Ribbentrop, ma soprattutto da ragioni di sopravvivenza politica dei due regimi. Era impensabile che la sconfitta di uno potesse lasciar sopravvivere l’altro, tanto era radicale l’opposizione di idee e di prospettive sul futuro del mondo fra essi e gli avversari.
Prima ancora che si giungesse, invece, alla prova dei fatti, si dovette constatare la defezione dell’Italia. Formalmente la cosa assunse aspetti sfumati. L’Italia si disse provata dalla campagna d’Etiopia, dai problemi della pacificazione e dell’amministrazione dell’Impero, from the heavy economic and military consequences deriving from participation in the English Civil War and the recent occupation of Albania. Had expended enormous resources in these events and was not ready to face a new conflict. It was not, however, openly confessed the conclusion to exclude the Italian participation in the war and preferred to direct to the ally (August 25) exorbitant demands for raw materials, is willing to take the field at his side, only after they had been fully met.
On 26 August, at the request of Hitler, we specify these requests; Cyan draw up the list in his diary "is likely to kill a bull", a total 170milioni of tons, which would require trains to transport 17,000! The list was artfully constructed and inflated beyond measure, just to put the Germans unable to respond positively and immediately.
Germany are feeling the pinch. Outwardly, he showed the attitude of our worries not, whether with Poland would manage alone and the international situation was still such as to indicate little practical possibility of a Franco-British intervention. Mussolini, Hitler thanked him for his words of encouragement and camaraderie, expressly exempted him from acting, only churches, but the important thing is that the Italian side to be continued movements, preparations, in psychological warfare in short, so that British and French had no doubt that it faces, in the event of war, Germany and Italy, side by side.
The 27, insurance Mussolini gave Hitler to do so. On 28, the Anglo-French front wavered. Signs seemed to be more inclined to recommend to the Poles moderation. At the end of the month the situation to worsen again, the intransigence seems to prevail again.
The Italian diplomat Alberto Mellini Ponce de Leon recalled that Ciano, in the last days of August, he continues, cordial talks, even at home, with the British ambassador in Rome, Percy Loraine. But Ciano it was just the peak of the iceberg, and the anti-German and pro-British branch was very active at that time. In Italy, among the "fascists who counted," the men of the right, linked to international capitalism and the Freemasons, were very active. After the initial push
revolutionary fascism chose or were forced to endure, the path of compromise and agreed to use the old tools of the liberal state. This retold strength and prestige of the monarchy, which came in search of support and security men who were the architects of fascism, and now were "men of the King: Great, ambassador to London, Balbo, Governor of Libya, Bottai, De Vecchi , Federzoni, Immature, and others, who always finds in the intrigues of 25 July and 8 September.
new institutions were mere facade, power, custom in the hands of the Duce, behind which there was none. Indeed, behind the Duce, behind the apparent monolithic nature of the regime, there was a stir of forces without unity of purpose, a compromise cemented by the success of twenty years of the scheme, while always a compromise. It was already inherent in the way that fascism came to power, "an array of forces, interests, moods very different" as he deems De Felice.
Neither time had led to a clarification definitive, it appears, indeed, like Mussolini that lack of unity would lead to a strength rather than weakness. "Often they do not let down the hopes of the extremists, even encouraged them," recalls Peter Pomegranates "to be able to appear as a moderate in the eyes of the referee, the only man capable of government, at the right moment, to harness the forces present in its subversive party ".
Everything, whether as a political tactic for the control of power could be acceptable, there was some of Il Duce's summit convergent forces, such a leader should be. Giorgio Bocca, confirming: "Mussolini felt that his regime is all monolithic worked by underground streams, and exhausts to mediarle and we are the manufacturers, there is a monarchy with his court, there is the Church with his Apostolic See and the Tiber is tight. The route is to continue the ideology of fascism put together, including the rejection of any theoretical definition, and the illusion of finding a good one for all uses, including the practice of fascist power and soul-searching, much-vaunted but never reached. "
The military camp was abandoned to the intrigues of the generals, the militia remained a body-together, certainly not comparable to the Nazi SS. Diplomacy is a den of vipers in the service of a clear plan designed to force the country un cambio di campo, nel senso filo-inglese. Al centro dell’intrigo c’era addirittura il ministro degli esteri, genero del Duce, conte Galeazzo Ciano. L’Ambasciata di Berlino, la capitale dell’alleato, era il punto di forza dei nemici dell’alleanza. Il diplomatico Leonardo Simoni ad essa assegnato ci riferisce: “risuona tutta di voci apertamente ostili alla Germania”. L’ambasciatore Attolico “si augura che celeri trattative di pace impediscano un eccessivo rafforzamento della Germania”. Altro personaggio di rilievo dell’ambasciata è il conte Massimo Magistrati, che ha sposato una sorella di Ciano. Attolico, se ne serve “per esercitare su Ciano una benevola influenza moderating. " Military Attache, after having been head of the SIM (the military intelligence service) and Gen. Roat, which manifests against Germany "a firm and clearly hostile attitude. A fact which seems to do much admired by the many officers around him. " Press Officer is the Marquis Antinori, dominated by an "incredible hatred for Germans and the Reich."
No wonder, in such a context, which Ciano, contrary to the commitment made with the Germans, giving assurance to the British and French ambassadors to Italy would not be going to war! Under the date of August 31, in his diary, Ciano notes: "Percy Loraine comes to me, I let you know what has happened, then, pretending to be unable to hold a snap of the heart, I say:" Why do you want to create the impossible? You have not yet understood that we war against France and you do not ever start? "Percy Lorainesi moves. The eyes sparkle, takes my hands, "a fortnight I had realized this. And I telegraphed to my Government. The sizes of these days had shaken my confidence. But I am happy to have come this evening at Palazzo Chigi. To remove all doubt
Italian attitude you withdraw the provisions relating to the darkness. Il 1° settembre Ciano ripete a Francois Ponset quanto aveva detto a Loraine.
E’ difficile, oggi che l’Italia non ha alcun peso, valutare l’importanza di un tale fatto. Ma allora il prestigio italiano era all’apice e la nostra flotta temibilissima. Annunciare, prima dello scoppio delle ostilità, che ne saremmo restati fuori, fu quantomeno gravissimo, imperdonabile errore.
Quanto chiacchierone fosse Ciano in quei giorni, è testimoniato dal gen. Pesenti il quale riferisce: “S.A.R il duca Amedeo d’Aosta, rientrato in Africa Orientale il 26 agosto, dichiarò di essere certo che l’Italia non sarebbe entrata in guerra, avendo egli avuto di ciò personale, formal assurances from Foreign Minister Count Ciano.
England and France, freed from the concerns of a more generalized conflict, set about to settle in Germany. This he found himself overwhelmed by events heavier than he reasonably could have foreseen the attack and had to be Anglo-French free dell'alleato Italian.
"non-aggression and intervention
While the Germans fought with determination, Italy remained at the window, was declared non-belligerence. The trade flourished, sell (the Germans protest) Isotta Fraschini engines even for the enemies of our airplane ally. Continuing antigermanici riding Ciano and his clique, nor do we bother to fill the gaps, especially those organizational and absolute, military planning.
The months from September 1939 to June 1940 could have been valuable, but nothing was done. They wonder, is just one example, industry tanks less than it could provide.
When the German success is evident, and you can predict a forthcoming end of the war, Mussolini decided to take action to participate in the division of the spoils, but no one knew how to get on militarily, even if they have not taken anyone!
Mussolini had to declare expressly that would not fight for Germany, nor Germany, but Germany's side. That the declaration of war or opposed it the King or Cyan, neither the Chief of Staff Badoglio, Masonic any environment, that is known to be linked to democracy, says a lot.
What followed the declaration of war on June 10, 1940 was less serious than can be found in history books of all time. After we were to choose the moment considered most suitable for intervention, let us not throw all our weight to accelerate the conclusion of the conflict and we are on the defensive, as if we were attacked us. On June 7, the General Staff General Order 28 branches op. related to operations against France
- If you meet the French forces not be the first to attack.
- Do not fly over French territory.
- Stay 10 km from the border.
- No department will have to cross the border
There were letters of the French ambassador to the Duce, Badoglio el'addetto military contacts between January Parisot, requesting not to be attacked and promises not to attack.
There is no historical record in that regard, but it has been said even about the Churchill-Mussolini correspondence (English statesman himself racing to recover in 1945 on Lake Como), a Italian intervention built in agreement with the British, and French because they did not have to be alone with the "bad" Germans at the peace table.
events do not contradict this hypothesis as absurd. The declaration of war in fact not brought us any immediate tactical or strategic advantage. It took the Japanese, with the lesson of Pearl Harbor to see how you start a war!
were made manifest, however, experienced the negative consequences of the situation by ourselves into being. In one fell swoop we lost 212 ships, including 46 tankers for a total of 1,616,000 tons of shipping, trapped in enemy ports. It was just impossible to avoid losing them?
do not take advantage of circumstances and power relations very favorable to us. Giving up occupying Malta, the Aeronautical Information Service told us defended by 29 planes, while there was some (only three Gloster Gladiator, in cases, yet to be fitted). Admiral Cunningham June 17, 1940 wrote: "We decided now, you can clear up some of the deposits of the fleet and people are not necessary for the defense." Malta was considered to be lost!
was not blocked the Suez Canal was enough to make you jump ship with their holds full of concrete, or undermining it from the air.
encouraged Mussolini, in giving the order to remain on the defensive, our intelligence, not very active, but extremely alarmist. They gave us everywhere in conditions of heavy inferiority, while the opposite was true.
Who were those responsible for these services? For the Army Gen. Carboni, fatuous person, a friend of Ciano, who will meet in the breach during the period of the armistice. For the Navy, the traitor Admiral Maugeri later decorated by the Americans for his services.
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While we were at that time in Libya for a total of 221,530 men 14 divisions, 1,801 guns, 4,600 machine guns, 3,800 submachine guns, 339 wagons, 2,500 motorcycles and 9,600 vehicles in June and will reach other 1,250 vehicles, food, fuel, ammunition and heavy tanks of the first 70 Centaur, you express concerns about a possible French initiative from Tunisia, where there was this division for some time and it was feared accorresse returned from Syria to Egypt, a wonderful, why not existed, "Weygand army."
even after the surrender of the French were a pincer move against Egypt and Sudan, Libya and the troops of the Empire. Egypt and Sudan were virtually unprotected and protected from the air by very few squadrons of aircraft. They would not have received neither a man nor a gun or a tank or a plane, until September! The ideal for the planned Duck!
Remember Gen. William Platt, commander of British troops operating in Sudan, that his forces were only 5,000 men of the SDF (Sudan Defence Force) a kind of colonial police and three British battalions, without guns and tanks and just some air out of 2,000 km border. English colonel says Baker that "there were a thousand reasons for considering the Sudan almost lost."
To the south, that, according to Col. Baker, "the defense of the Kenyan could count on 10,000 men, British Somaliland and Aden on another 5,000." AOI in the Duke of Aosta in fact had 300,000 men, 400 guns, 60 tanks, 323 aircraft. It was also equipped sufficient supplies of gasoline and also to launch a large-scale offensive. Some supplies could reach and was carried by air from Libya, and ships from Japan.
The relationship of superiority to the Italians in Africa, was therefore 10 to 1 for the ground forces and 5 to 2 for air, always assuming that the British aircraft (old Vincent, 1928) could potentially match Speed \u200b\u200band Italian opponents.
Whatever the means available to the Duke of Aosta, he had to avoid dispersing the forces on the vast territories of the Empire, take the initiative, or at least defend positions that favor certain there were.
* * * *
The only movement of troops was made in June 1940 against the French Alpine border. A resounding failure for the lack of preparation and the objective difficulties of the land did not allow to capture any key position. But we really wanted to win them? The French historian Henry Azeau asks, "the Franco-Italian begins with a sort of secret agreement?".
The existence of such an agreement did not give evidence, unfortunately, Italy during the armistice negotiations. On 18 June, Mussolini and Hitler met in Monaco, it was decided that Italy would have required the sale to the French di Corsica, Tunisia e Costa dei Somali, oltre l’occupazione della Provenza fino al Rodano. Il 24 giugno a Roma, a Villa Incisa, fu firmato l’armistizio, rinunciando da parte nostra a quanto si era annunciato di voler esigere. Il mancato possesso della Tunisia, in particolare, fu gravissimo, si rinunciò a rendere meno lunga e meno pericolosa la rotta dei nostri convogli con la Libia e si posero le premesse per enormi perdite di uomini e materiali. L’ambasciatore Guariglia e Vittorio Mussolini imputano ai consigli di Ciano questo tragico errore. Resta il fatto che Mussolini, nove ore dopo aver approvato il testo della convenzione di armistizio, ordinava di annullarlo, quando era già stato stampato e pronto alla consegna. Hitler asked, leave Italy to lay the conditions believed necessary, ensuring once again however, that he would not sign any separate armistice with France, whatever our needs. As a final tribute, also withdrew to the delivery of anti-fascist exiles.
The months between June and October, which could be decisive, were thrown into total inaction, I keep thinking, Mussolini and the General Staff, so profoundly wrong. In this equivocal indolence sagged the enthusiasm of a people willing to believe. What might be a genuine struggle for liberation was born under the sign of yellow political and diplomatic and calculating, then degenerated between the anger of the honest, first in unintelligible babble policy, then in medieval palace intrigues.
waited, believing smart, that victory for us rain from heaven on the Allies. But Hitler
summer 1940, despite previous, was still hopeful of finding an agreement with the British. He expected gratitude for them "forgiven" at Dunkirk, by not having insisted on the bottom, to avoid too seriously offended that the honor would impose them to react to the bitter end. He would not, consistent with what he had written in Mein Kampf, between Germany and England to create a furrow filled, and is historically very uncertain even if I've ever really thought of invading England.
therefore had to think to do something for ourselves. Closed the campaign with France, were concentrated in the Po valley, 600,000 military "unemployed". As if the war was won, it was decided to use them in a campaign against Yugoslavia, were sent to the eastern border of 37 divisions and 85 groups of artillery, as well as special units, warehouses, services. It also decided to lay off 600,000 reservists called up recently. In October, 300,000 are already home. Just in time to be called up to the war in Greece! It seems that Mussolini and the General Staff would forget the only completely open borders, and Libyan and Mediterranean theater of operations in general. This war just as the elimination of the French fleet opened interesting perspectives for us.
But on July 8, an order to prevent Supermarina Admiral Bergamini with the fleet to take part in the battle of Punta Stilo in Calabria, against old English ships refurbished for less with our speed and range of artillery. "Do not go out-I repeat-do not go out" is the order of Supermarina recalls the USM (Historical Office of the Navy).
In late August, to combat ships move out from Alexandria Taranto from the fleet, 5 battleships, 13 cruisers, 39 hunting. The fleet, bound by strict orders Supermarina does not give battle to force three times smaller and consumes massive amounts of precious fuel.
immediate consequence of this strange, inexplicable start of the conflict was to affect the nations concerned to intervene on our side: Spain and Turkey. Found inaction Italian and crystallize the conflict, and its extension with the foreseeable risks, they drew them incentive to remain prudent in waiting. The British who had long feared for Gibraltar, (Churchill had to declare "the intervention of Spain avrebbe potuto dare alla guerra sviluppi imprevedibili”) ne trassero conforto e cominciarono a pensare che forse il peggio era passato.
Per noi italiani, invece, il peggio stava arrivando ed era la materializzazione della guerra parallela: nessun piano strategico comune, nessuna consultazione tra i due stati maggiori, un costume che purtroppo proseguì per tutta la guerra. Una guerra davvero “parallela”, condotta all’insegna della dispersione delle forze, della gelosia e della disistima tra alleati, senza che nessuno dei due si rendesse conto che in tal modo ci si avviava alla sconfitta.
C’è da dire che la responsabilità principale di ciò ricade certamente su noi Italiani. Essendo militarmente più deboli, dovevamo essere doppiamente volonterosi e ricercare la vittoria ponendo al servizio dell’alleanza, senza riserve, tutto quanto poteva essere dato. Invece, oltre a pesare poco militarmente, avemmo impensabili alzate di testa che misero in difficoltà l’alleato. Ad esso non era sfuggito l’atteggiamento del gruppo di Ciano. La fama di essere poco fidati, cioè di chiacchierare troppo, era ormai consolidata. Non si vede perciò a quale titolo i Tedeschi avrebbero dovuto informarci di ogni cosa stessero per architettare. Lo stesso Hitler ci dà testimonianza di ciò: “nonostante l’assoluta fiducia che riponevo in Mussolini personalmente, mi ritenni in duty to keep him in ignorance of my intention in all cases where an indiscretion would jeopardize our security. He, unfortunately, had complete confidence in Cyan. "
A series of disasters
On 28 October 1940, without reason and without proper preparation, we bogged down in the countryside of Greece.
At the trial in Verona, in January 1944 that saw him sentenced to death and shot, Ciano was conducted by the conspiracy of July 25, but it was only the culmination of his action, had previously already done immeasurable damage to the nation. The Greek campaign was his masterpiece. Told, and was believed to have corrupted elements of Greek primo piano. Per parte sua Badoglio, con criminale faciloneria, accettò di avallare un’operazione oltremare senza nemmeno interpellare i responsabili della Marina e dell’Aeronautica.
La campagna, strategicamente, fu un’operazione demenziale. Si decise di attaccare dai monti, con la prospettiva, se le cose fossero andate bene, di dover scavalcare una catena di montagne dietro l’altra e per di più si attaccò in condizioni di grave inferiorità numerica.
La guerra con la Grecia, ammessa la necessità di farla, avrebbe potuto essere risolta in poche ore; la flotta, da Taranto avrebbe raggiunto il Pireo e nella stessa serata la Grecia si sarebbe trovata con un nuovo Government-aligned axis position. You do not even implement the 'Emergency G ", which included landing in Corfu, a few kilometers from the mainland.
Another solution, just as logical and inexpensive, would be that, termination of the transaction agree with the ally. In the spring, in fact the Germanic troops, passing through Bulgaria, put an end to the conflict in a few days. General Papagos, supreme commander of the greek army, he admits that he could not defend both the Albanian and the Bulgarian border.
Withholding instead the fleet at Taranto, in a few days three battleships were torpedoed at anchor by a squadron of Swordfish, old, slow English torpedo bombers. The aircraft had taken off at 170 km. From Taranto, the carrier Illustrius. The English team had been sighted, but no such order our ships to sea to intercept it. One British historian said: "For twenty-four hours, Admiral Cunningham waved the red cloth along the heel of Italy, but the challenge was not upheld."
In December, the Italian list of woes is longer.
this time touched the weapon Libyan Graziani, who in three months the outbreak of hostilities had moved forward only 50 miles, and stood at Sidi Barrani, after, nel balzo in avanti, sei prigionieri!
A Graziani, Mussolini aveva scritto: “L’invasione della Gran Bretagna è decisa, è in corso di ultimazione come preparativi e avverrà. Circa l’epoca, può essere tra un paio di settimane o un mese. Ebbene il giorno in cui il primo plotone di soldati germanici toccherà il suolo inglese, voi simultaneamente attaccherete”. Altro che attaccare! Un esercito che ignora come dottrina e come prassi la guerra di movimento, non sa neppure disporsi a difesa contro un nemico capace di farla. Il generale Berti, ricorda l’U.S.E. (ufficio storico dell’esercito) comandante della X armata, quella che è attaccata di sorpresa e sbaragliata a few thousand British, is licensed in Italy. Instead of returning immediately to the news of the attack, takes time with the excuse that the mother is ill and then reappears at Cyrene, under the command of Graziani in civilian clothing.
This was the spirit that animated the men who were, unfortunately, "count". But we must not forget that the opposite was also other people die. A few days before he died in combat, Guido Pallotta wrote to his parents: "I am in excellent health and I thank heaven, for it to be repatriated due to illness would be my greatest sorrow." But Pallotta was only a lieutenant.
Within days we lose 130,000 men, 1,000 guns, 400 wagons. It must be said that if our tanks were small, then even the English ones were huge, our 3 tons, 5 the British!
What is missing was the action of command. Even the Air Force is drawn into the vortex, in a few days are lost 1,000 aircraft, of which several hundred destroyed on the ground. On January 4, 1941, Bardia, surrounded by 23 (ventitre!) British tanks, surrendered 45,000 men with 400 guns, after a series of fights so "furious" that Montgomery had to call them "dog fights".
The English went on the offensive facilitated by our 706 heavy trucks which had seized, and January 21, having only 12 tanks, but with a regiment wagons retrofitted with the Italians captured at Tobruk, where they appear before the same day, give up our other 32,000 men.
military routes of this kind were decisive role in the war and the morale of the people, starting a chain reaction of distrust and self reflux to private. Look at the Albanian writer Ismail Kadare in his beautiful "The drums of the rain": "When men begin to guard against danger is because they have lost all hope of victory."
With what spirit could fight while our brave soldiers in a strategic context contradictory and led by a professionally Staff does not exist? It 'obvious that errors and failures influence of reflex and other situations make the measures taken to remedy increasingly problematic and hardly conclusive.
For fatal offensive in Greece, they proceeded, since Cyan was still in favor of the Duce, Badoglio's dismissal. Remember Duilio Susmel, that the marshal has resigned (November 26, 1940) pending the final decision, took a week of license that he spent on the estate of a friend in Lombardy to play bowls and enjoyable hunting games. The country was at war, Albania continued the retreat, the soldiers fought in the mud and the Chief of Staff played bowling and shoot the birds!
The disastrous performance of the country of Albania (taken to calling it, rather than Greece, because now being fought on our territory) Yugoslavia led to a dramatic turnaround, which was needed for an occupation that was intended to immobilize tens of divisions.
Hitler himself, in his will, which reminds injury have led operations in the Balkans in the attack on Russia caused a delay of four weeks, weeks that perhaps cost the war!
In February, while Franco is in talks with Mussolini in Bordighera, la flotta inglese si presenta davanti a Genova e la cannoneggia violentemente. I soli grossi calibri delle corazzate sparano 1.055 colpi. Scrive Giovanni Artieri: “sapevano tutto della difesa, debolissima, della dislocazione degli obiettivi, dell’inesistenza di campi minati”. Non riuscimmo a reagire in alcun modo! E’ superfluo aggiungere come finì l’invito rivolto da Mussolini a Franco affinché partecipasse alla nostra guerra!
Nella primavera 1941, mentre in Europa centinaia di divisioni tedesche erano inutilizzate, e si delineava coll’intervento dell’Asse nei Balcani la successiva più grave dispersione di forze provocata dalla campagna all’Est, si compiva anche il destino dell’A.O.I, dove in breve tutte le nostre forze furono messe fuori combattimento.
Il generale Lettow Worbek, nel 1914-1918, con 2.000 tedeschi, resistette in Tanganica per quattro anni!
Il nostro viceré si arrese all’Amba Alagi praticamente senza combattere. Degno suo epitaffio fu il commento di Ciano nel diario “temeva più la vittoria tedesca che quella inglese”. “Una figura scialba” la definisce Giorgio Bocca; “fu pessimo comandante” dice Franco Baldini, “dimostrò una singolare incapacità di afferrare al volo la situazione”.
Sfuggì al duca che non muoversi ed ostinarsi a presidiare i lunghissimi boundaries of the strategy was absurd. If the Empire was destined to fall, energy costs were available immediately, when the right time could provide unexpected results. "The conduct of strategic operations," Altieri recognizes the monarchy, "was inconsistent."
There is now no doubt that the Duke could occur and go up the Nile in Egypt in July 1940 that would have forced the British to divert forces from the Libyan front, doing away with any attack. Our one offensive effort, which on closer inspection resulted in the withdrawal of troops from the borders that counted was that absurd to conquer the English Somalia, an area that British resident in Berbera, the capital, located "just feet above the anal orifice of the British Empire."
In defense, was our heroic resistance Cheren, where shone the tenacity of the gen. Carnimeo. We were forced to give up just because they missed some crucial moment in the battalion! The Italian air force has disappeared, by order of the gen. Pinna planes are survivors of reserves to Massawa. The head of the front, Jan. Frusci, not only does not supply men Cheren (there were tens of thousands of idle men in Asmara to Massawa, Addis Ababa, Gondar Gen. Nasi offered by 30,000 men), but was distracted by Cheren troops, the 44th Brigade, for example, were started as a reinforcement or the big guns of the batteries Marine Massawa.
After the departure of Cheren, a fresh regiment of grenadiers of Sardinia, the 10th, and was sent to deployed Adle Teclesan up good positions to defend dell'Asmara, a company with mortars and a machine gun. But after a brief exchange of gunfire, the entire regiment raised his arms and surrendered. A few days later in Massawa give up another 10,000 men.
Our generals, in elementary school, had not read the Orazi and Curiazi?
the south, in Somalia, we lined up to defend along the Juba until the same time providing dry river did not allow the transition to English. Our line of defense was, moreover, very thin, as they were held in Kismayo, where they surrendered without fighting, 14 battalions and 6 artillery batteries. These forces guarding what was to become our largest port on the Indian Ocean, but then there was still nothing. Neither one is saying that lacked the fuel to move these troops, in Mogadishu, the British found only 6,000 tons of gas!
No wonder that at the time of the fall of the Empire, two of the more general view, that rustling of which we saw on the prowess and the Chief of Staff of the Duke d'Aosta, Claudio Trezzani, were collected and transported by plane to America where they were guests of the Roosevelt White House.
A demonstration of how much more could be done, it should be noted that in the territory of Azeb-Galla, schieratisi with the Italians since 1935, fighting continued until 1943, when officers and British planes were due to the resistance.
failing to use the last chance of winning
resolved the Greek campaign, in May '41 was occupied the island of Crete. The situation improved in the Mediterranean, but apparently lacked a breath truly strategic programs of the Axis war. While the island could be an excellent springboard for operations to Cyprus, Suez and Iraq, where a rebellion had broken out anti-British opened unexpected perspectives, his employment was an end in itself.
He had not even thought of rest to operate from a position as one of the Dodecanese, Rhodes, almost perpendicularly over the Suez Canal and Alexandria, not far from the Asian continent, halfway between the airfields of southern and oil wells in the Middle East, should have been close-knit naval base. Not if they have heard about throughout the entire war!
Nothing was still compromised, but it was urgently needed to lash the country, demonstrate that the regime had actually built a different mentality, combative. Positive attitudes of this kind, however, remained the preserve of a few, include examples of Guido Pallotta, Nicholas Giani and Teseo Tesei, the boldness of the departments of X-Mas, self-sacrifice of the paratroopers of the Folgore, the tank drivers in Africa, the Alpini in Russia the sacrifice of the entire aircraft weapon, that of submariners and Navy nell'ingrato task of directing and escorting supplies to Libya. Basically nothing but
moves. There was no uniform political structure capable of mobilizing the country's military mistakes multiplied, the Libyan front was neglected while dozens of divisions to do nothing; went on leave and the swing of recalls. But most of all no good effort was made to mobilize against the so-called internal lacked any attempt to impress on the nation's energy industries or the will to win. "The Council of Ministers," recalls De Felice, "met during the campaign in Greece only three times." The whole industry showed its reluctance to commit itself and the conditions of all its political weakness in not able to harness it, especially the arms. It is not true that we were able to do more! A comparison with the effort in World War I can be convincing: between 1913 and 1919 the war costs absorbed 76% of government expenditure and 38% of gross national income. In the crucial years of the War, only 20% of public expenditure, and only 6% of gross national income. A percentage even lower than that on certain times of peace!
give just one: in 1942 they built a few hundred thousand planes against the Germans and the Allies. So, not only misuse of resources and means available (eg la flotta che, torniamo a dirlo, in quanto tale non fu mai impiegata), ma anche autentica penuria di strumenti bellici, per mancanza di pianificazione produttiva, di direttive precise, di uomini giusti al posto giusto.
Una così sconclusionata azione politico-amministrativa ci portò ad essere protagonisti di avvenimenti importantissimi, sui quali però ci fu impossibile realmente influire. Se si era capita l’importanza della guerra per i destini dell’Europa e si era deciso di non essere assenti alla loro costruzione, era necessario appoggiarci pienamente all’alleato fin dall’inizio, quando, in una guerra breve, anche il nostro peso poteva essere determinante e uno sforzo generoso, nel courage to burn all our resources, could be crowned with success.
A long conflict, led wearily waiting suspiciously in a victory by the Alliance, it was hoped that narrow victory, the result of negotiations, compromises could not determine that the failure of our bluff, conducted without sense and without any determination.
the conflict escalated in late June without informing Italy and Japan, Germany took the decision to "affect the abscess Communist."
As if we did not have enough troops around the world, we decided to send immediately to the new front of the CSIR (Body Spedizione Italiano in Russia) al comando del gen. Giovanni Messe, uno dei generali migliori della nostra guerra.
La guerra al comunismo fu evento importantissimo, sentito in tutta Europa, tant’è vero che grandiosa fu la partecipazione di volontari di tutti i paesi. Si offriva l’opportunità all’Asse di enunciare, con solennità, precisi impegni politici circa “l’ordine nuovo” che intendeva instaurare in Europa, una indicazione definitiva sugli scopi della guerra e sul futuro assetto mondiale.
Stupisce che uomini politicamente esperti della psicologia delle masse, come Mussolini e Hitler, portatori di una visione nuova del mondo, autenticamente rivoluzionaria, abbiano ceduto la mano, l’iniziativa, a decrepiti demagoghi conservatori quali Churchill e Roosevelt. Il 15 agosto a Placenta Bay, nelle gelide acque di terranova, essi diramarono una dichiarazione congiunta che prese il nome di “carta atlantica”: “La guerra viene combattuta senza mirare ad alcun ingrandimento territoriale e si esclude qualsiasi cambiamento che non sia in accordo con la volontà liberamente espressa dai popoli interessati. Sarà rispettato il diritto di tutti i popoli a scegliersi la forma di governo sotto la quale vivere e si ristabilirà l’autogoverno nelle nazioni che ne sono state private con la forza”. Al Museo nazionale di Washington migliaia di visitatori sostano riverenti di fronte this monumental deception.
Programs political autonomy, restoration of freedom from communism denied, drawn from national administrative bodies, would have helped, says Gen. Messe, the penetration of the Axis forces in the occupied Soviet territories.
* * * *
end of the year the crucial fact of the war.
Japan without informing Germany and Italy, gives birth to its parallel war and choose instead one of the competitors on the field against its allies, a new one, the United States. Those that already during the "neutrality" were deployed substantially against the Axis (a Placenta Bay, even if outside of his presidential prerogatives, so he was forced to deny it, Roosevelt had pledged to "protect" the Azores and send an ultimatum to Japan), fielded their enormous potential industrial and, of Moreover, the supply of Soviet tanks, planes, trucks, in incredible quantities.
On 7 December 1941, the day the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the German tanks were in front of Moscow. An attack of the rising sun against the tail of the monster Soviet Far East, would solve the problem forever in the world of communism.
The war, however, began for the Japanese with a series of brilliant successi e di riflesso lo scacchiere mediterraneo ne trasse giovamento. Era un’ultima occasione di fare finalmente sul serio, di uscire dal torpore, di giocare il tutto per tutto. Ancora una volta il fronte decisivo doveva essere per noi quello africano, che poteva offrire questa volta addirittura la possibilità di un aggancio con le truppe tedesche, che erano ormai giunte al Caucaso.
Occorreva innanzitutto approfittare della superiorità aeronavale raggiunta in Mediterraneo grazie agli affondamenti di navi inglesi ad opera dei nostri mezzi d’assalto e ad opera degli alleati germanici. Né i Britannici potevano contare su rimpiazzi, a causa dei disastri navali loro inflitti dai Giapponesi in Asia.
Concretare tale superiorità con l’occupazione di Malta, duramente martellata dall’aviazione e sottoposta a blocco, avrebbe permesso un adeguato rifornimento alle nostre truppe, ferme a El Alamein, ma disposte ad ogni sacrificio per raggiungere Alessandria, il Delta e il Canale.
La stessa preoccupazione di salvaguardare l’equilibrio residuo dell’alleanza, doveva spingerci a rafforzare al massimo il fronte africano, essendo esso un teatro d’operazioni secondario per la Germania.
Il tempo lavorava ormai contro di noi. Andava abbandonata qualsiasi tattica difensiva e ogni sacrificio di uomini, mezzi e materiali, andava inserito in un disegno univoco, coerente, ardito. Le risorse were used in one point, he could provide crucial opportunities. What sense could have been dealing with the "central reserve" (a group of divisions "available" in the Po Valley) or the coastal divisions? Each vehicle, each gun had to take the path of Africa. The same fleet was used to support the Army in a major breakthrough in the battle of El Alamein. Such a use was not unthinkable, the Allies employed many times the guns of the fleet as well as in support of landing operations, including support of troops operating not far from the coast, as in Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and Normandy.
precisely in those months, our fleet is retired in ports rather than away from military operations. Not even he was employed at the time of the invasion of the country, so that, by delaying the continuous action, it was possible armistice on 8 September 1943, surrender to the enemy, after more than three years of war, modern battleships that had never fired a cannon shot.
But the General Staff was now full of mental reservation, they preferred to have, in the peninsula, troops to oppose the Germans (with what results you saw then!) Rather than "risk to win." Huge
therefore were shortcomings in supplies destined the Libyan front. Recognizes in this respect Gen. Cavanagh, the chief of staff who succeeded Badoglio in his diary (vol. October 1941 - September 1942), that "the lack of supplies often complained they were not only the fruit of an enemy, but stemmed not very often that many parts of Italy. " Only 10% of vehicles available, for example, was used in Libya for more than 50% was neglected in Italy, while the rest was lost in France, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Greece and Russia. The East was the theater of operations where, in the summer 1q942, deep, almost all of the resources available, certainly in terms of quality the best. Mussolini, who apparently had the whole of Germany, he wanted at all costs not to deface. Who is allowed to criticize the level of forces prepared for sending to the Russian front, he replied: "We can not be lower than Slovakia."
Slovakia Russia had sent in two divisions. We send you 227,000 men, 16,700 vehicles, 4,470 motomezzi, 1,130 artillery tractors, 19 trucks, 55 tanks, 588 artillery pieces, 380 anti-tank, 52 anti-aircraft pieces, 220 anti-aircraft machine guns. We lack even removed the anti-aircraft batteries of our cities, as if the front were decisive for us in Russia, as if the relative weakness of the opponent on the African theater of war is not advisable to have mass there.
This chain of errors marked by indecision and finally the tide of war. In a few months followed by the glorious, but irremediable defeat of El Alamein, the Anglo-American landing in North Africa, Stalingrad, the permanent loss of North Africa. The inevitable end
As the hottest hours of the day is prepared by the heat of midday, it was the policy guidelines and decisions of the period preceding the outbreak of the conflict and the very grave mistakes in the first months of war to determine , come automatica, fatale conseguenza, la sconfitta.
Ecco perché, eventi militarmente pur importanti come la crisi del fronte russo dopo Stalingrado, la campagna di Tunisia, quella di Sicilia, non meritano di essere esaminati al fine dell’accertamento delle cause della sconfitta. Essi non potevano più influenzare le sorti del conflitto. In tale clima maturò la congiura in due tempi del 25 luglio e dell’8 settembre. Essa percosse un popolo disciplinato ma deluso, e Forze Armate il cui peso, rilevante se impiegato al momento opportuno, era stato mal dosato ed era ormai ininfluente.
Non incontrò la congiura resistenza alcuna nella dirigenza politico-militare dello Stato. Anzi proprio da essa took life more serious episodes of dissociation. They had re-establish the line of the group already enlisted in 1930, according to anti-German, Minister of the Royal House, Duke Acquarone.
Opportunism, the feeling that it was now necessary to abandon the boat sinking, a boat that long, however, had assured all possible comfort, made from cement to two strands of the plot, the "fascist" and the "military" both made up of "men of the king. Anfuso, our ambassador in Budapest, he found in Rome Ciano, who became ambassador to the Vatican "immersed up to their necks in the conspiracy fascist, watertight compartment General of the conspiracy "and always in touch with Coopers and with the general Carboni and SM Castellano.
are the days when Ciano relates in his diary the words of one of the leaders of the conspiracy, Dino Grandi: "I did not know how to smuggle fascist for 20 years." At that moment the man who boasted of being in frequent contact with the King, was simultaneously the chairman of the House and Minister of Justice.
addition to Great, in the front row, there were Bottai, De Vecchi, De Bono, Bastianini, bitter, Albini, Federzoni. They were all men from this fascist regime that De Felice movement opposed to fascism, that they were not truly fascist but men simply "right" is demonstrated by the fact that they themselves could propose a change, the liquidation of fascism from the inside, by accepting a return to the old schema antithetical to democracy. They showed these men are willing to relocate themselves, and how much less significant of fascism, the "new management" with the ease with which later merged, smooth, with the survivors of the monarchy and later the business of party politics .
Neither is the case of insult and indicated as turncoats, to have found the social decay, caused by democracy, an excellent broth. La loro presenza, un tempo, nelle file del movimento fascista dimostra solo quanto poco attento sia stato questo, accettando di considerarli suoi uomini.
Quanto ai militari, si è già detto di Badoglio, Roatta, Carboni. Di Ambrosio, il nuovo capo di Stato Maggiore, vogliamo solo ricordare che il giorno in cui fu annunziato l’armistizio, era assente da Roma perché doveva seguire il trasloco di certi mobili, che da Torino venivano sfollati nella sua villa di campagna. Ci pare che anche qualche nome di ammiraglio vada citato: Pavesi “artefice”della resa di Pantelleria, difesa da 40 batterie e 12.000 uomini; arresosi senza che il nemico nemmeno avesse iniziato lo sbarco. Brivonesi, messo sotto process for the events of November 9, 1940, when he turned to the enemy by being responsible Terga sinking of seven ships and two belonging to the convoy hunting assignment. The reference won him the title of guardian of Mussolini, a prisoner in La Maddalena. Maugeri, decorated by the United States for the valuable services rendered in the period before September 8. Leonardi, commander of the fortified town of Siracusa-Augusta at the time of the Anglo-American landing in Sicily. This fortified complex with 6 powerful batteries, the most powerful in the Mediterranean, with guns capable of hitting 381 in twin tower, up to 35 miles, was defended by 17 anti-aircraft batteries and an armored train. The batteries and even the train, which could semmai essere allontanato, furono fatti saltare quando ancora il nemico era lontanissimo, e nemmeno una minima avvisaglia di combattimento si era avuta. Non vennero invece fatte saltare le attrezzature portuali, che agevolarono poi le operazioni di sbarco e di rifornimento nemiche. Supermarina definisce in una relazione questi fatti “strenua resistenza”!; quanto al treno, fu “sopraffatto e poi fatto saltare”! In quegli stessi giorni 300-400 aerei venivano distrutti al suolo.
I personaggi politici e militari, che nulla avevano fatto per vincere la guerra, si trovarono ad un certo punto di fronte alle conseguenze della loro insipienza ed all’interrogativo su come farne uscire il paese.
The possibility to move from conflict "Italian", reversing the alliances, it was attempted. Remember that General John Artieri Castellano, appearing in Lisbon Bedel to General Smith, Chief of Staff Brigadier General Eisenhower and the Strong "assured that the Italians wanted an immediate reversal of policy, namely Germany and the abandonment of the covenant 'alignment to the British and Americans. " A memorial British, sarcastic, defines the proposed Castellano "a new combination," "The two Allied officers believed that Castellano had come to sign the surrender. Does not take long to realize that the Italian general want to sign an alliance. "
But the only way out is granted, was that of unconditional surrender.
The only obstacle to concluding it was removed from the coup of July 25. Mussolini was in fact realized so that the war was lost, but it should be recognized style. These in fact the best account of itself in the second part of the conflict, when adapted to trust, with bitter realism, only in the possibility of the alliance, took care not to miss the commitments made and bravely faced the consequences of their mistakes. He would never allowed to miss the word, to withdraw from an alliance, under the pretext that continue the fight was no longer feasible, then stand up, immediately, against the ally of yesterday, violating every sense of honor and national dignity.
could avoid the uncertain prospect of any more damage to the nation, balance the contempt that such an act would have agreed to cover?
Apart from the fact that the yield, the damage to the country they grew, on September 8 in fact contributed to the fame spread throughout the world that we, the comedians, phrase-and unfair to the people who, in short, can not be rely.
With Mussolini the nation was headed toward the predictable culmination of a defeat with honor. Without Mussolini we had damage and pranks, we were marching on the road of shame and betrayal.
As this is a true and sufficient evidence to prove it, that of Gen. Westphall. On September 7, the Italian Minister of the Navy, Admiral Count De Courten (of which lodge?), Went to the Field Marshal Kesselring to inform him that the Italian fleet would have sailed on 8 and 9 from La Spezia to deal with the British fleet in the Mediterranean ". "The Italian fleet - he said with tears in his eyes - he would have won or would have been destroyed." Then explained in details the alleged battle plan.
behavior of this kind, and those Unfortunately, many who were its corollary, it is "paying" even against the Anglo-Americans. It generates, logically, only suspicion and contempt. A British historian says we so casually: "House of Savoy and his army have never ended a war on the side where they started, except when the war has lasted so long because they mutassero twice."
Under these conditions, it is understandable as the "co-belligerence" with new allies took on issues from the start insulting.
The reality was very different from the South to spread tall tales of our documentaries today by the Masonic Stato Maggiore; ricorda Agostino degli Espinosa: “i nostri soldati dovettero servire in qualità di facchini, conducenti di salmerie, artieri, manovali. Migliaia e migliaia di giovani italiani vennero impiegati in questi lavori umili, spesso in sottordine a personale militare di colore”.
Quanto deleteria sia stata per l’Italia l’opera dei congiurati del 25 luglio e dell’8 settembre ci è testimoniato dalle stesse fonti storiche alleate: è dimostrato, tra l’altro, che la guerra fu portata sulla penisola proprio a causa della resa. Scrive il colonnello britannico Sheppard, che al gen. Eisenhower fu comunicato, nel luglio 1943, che per fine novembre sarebbero state ritirate from the Mediterranean to England and spend available for landing on the mainland four American and three British divisions, in addition to three groups of U.S. heavy bombers. Since mid-October, the same fate suffered 80% of the landing craft. U.S. General Marshall, who was following the directives of his Minister of War Henry Stimson, the British General Alexander says, "not an urgent account of the treasures that lie at our feet in the Mediterranean." The U.S. in fact had no intention of fighting in Italy and insisted that all the serious effort against Germany. Eisenhower's divisions could be replaced, at most, in June 1944.
was obvious to all that, in addition to the fact that the Allies chose Sicily, giving the most promising strategies landing in Sardinia, that the invasion of the peninsula was not provided. Thank you to surrender the other hand, the Anglo-American troops were tempted to lift the groped Italy.
Even if you have not proved as easy as the allies had hoped, for the Italian people was a scourge to it was added the work of anti-fascists, which aggravated the balance of the grief and devastation, with the poke the Civil War.
tragic result of a policy of compromise
After a series of meetings with sparring-patner the likes of Ethiopia, Spain, Albania, we climbed into the ring for a serious encounter, since, as Italy was at that time title, but especially for the ' importance of the stakes. The 1940-1945 war was a gigantic clash of power, the victory of one group or the other would decide the future of Europe for decades. It was not a war of another era where the outcome is manifested in the shifting of borders.
was really the struggle of the blood against gold.
It was the world to impose a development model over another. It was ensure future generations of European freedom from suffocation mercantile and materialistic, a new spiritual inspiration, a different justice between states, social forms authentically, not marginalizing, popular participation.
Profound was thus presented to a meeting like that with a political leadership only formally compact, and a staff, to be good, inept. When wars are made, require the determination to win a clear vision of the goals to be pursued and the means to be prepared.
Germany gave us this example of political unity and good military capabilities. Hitler himself created, confiding it to Todt, the Ministry per l’armamento e per il munizionamento. “Gli fu possibile determinare mensilmente – scrive E. P. Schramm – l’orientamento della produzione e l’entità di qualsiasi tipo di arma o munizione. Lo Stato Maggiore, forniva solamente, mese per mese, elenco delle forniture avute nel mese precedente, situazione, consumi, fabbisogni”. Ma tutto ciò era possibile, dipendeva, dall’aver interamente la situazione, uomini e strumenti di produzione, sotto controllo.
Da noi in Italia si sarebbe, purtroppo dovuto improvvisare.
Non siamo quindi d’accordo con la tendenza ad assolvere gli alti gradi delle FF.AA. implicati negli aspetti più bui della storia of those years. We do not accept that is to consider, as some historians, victims of the regime the players on the field of defeat. Their ignorance damaged at the same time, country and regime. However
to none other than Mussolini, can ultimately be attributed to the bad choice of such high military rank, as is evident in his responsibilities have not been able to ensure full support, even from the hierarchies of the party and state bureaucracy.
certainly can not accuse Mussolini, after a lifetime spent serving the nation honestly, that he voluntarily led Italy to disaster. The unfortunate result was determined from having, he always avoided the problem of clarifying the forces that helped him, without sharing the goals. Overestimated his political skill, thinking they were always able to control people and events. But this time it was not to harness the monarchy, to appease the extremist fringes of the party, or acting as a mediator between unions and industry. The stakes were enormous. Mussolini realized this even if belatedly, but the Italian reality, political and economic, was what it was, and the times of war are times of reform and was therefore forced to act with the benefit of what he offered the moment. He was unable to conduct a full-scale war, with all its strategic and economic implications. He had to settle for making a political war, not to bring down a hard, unstable balance, moved cautiously, but all the subtle and contradictory space that was automatically granted to those who had diametrically opposed to their objectives, and that could advantage offered by his tactics of stretch marks.
Boss absurd centralization of power had prevented the party to change, and any contribution of sclerotic new energy. Mussolini went so far as to occupy both eight ministries. John Jury, wittily commented: "As you can imagine that one stick is enough to lead eight orchestras specialized in performing music different? "and consequently" a number of administrative bodies remained practically without driving the people that replaced Mussolini in individual assignments, exercising command without assuming the associated liability. Mussolini, accepting with other tasks and executive directors also ceased to be the leader of a revolution. "
The party was merged with the state but the state had not become fascist. Not only the party was completely discredited and, as noted by De Felice, "devoid of autonomy and political initiative of the State," but there was space in it even to former opponents, it came the madness of the inscriptions practically mandatory.
And here you are at the crucial moment of the war, in situations which did not way out. How
be able to demonstrate to people the reasons for a convoluted, Machiavellian plan? How to remedy the initial errors? How to revive institutions now embalmed? How to restore the efficiency and prestige of the armed forces, to be compromised by failures of parallel war and the political and strategic mistakes that had led the job? It was believable that you could reverse the fortunes of the war that really could be won, but when it was time to do so, had not wanted to fight?
A sad series of negative responses, that explain the passive acceptance by the leader of the events leading up to July 25, and the fortitude with which, after September 8, when all was lost, he agreed to act the part that was just delivered to him was full of history.
* * * *
A political lesson to be learned from these events: the hazard to be associated with individuals or groups with ties of loyalty to internationalist kind, whether political parties, central financial Zionist circles, Masonic lodges .
The cooperation offered by similar elements in a design course contrary to their real objectives, can not hide the manipulation or sabotage and inevitably condemned to failure.
better then a few steps forward, the absolute clarity of ideas, and the firm gradually, rather than bow his head to those constraints, which provide great, but illusory, leaps forward. Less then
facade, and more substance!
No fear, for us today, therefore, appear isolated because of intransigence and opposition to the system, are truly free and total. Only in this way, with clear boundaries between the deceptive democratic discourse and the alternative of the free you can achieve credibility, building trust and consensus.
Article taken from The No Free man 7 YEAR II
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