Daniele Scalea - Eurasia -
In Egypt, you are not, at least for now, we are witnessing a revolution but a military coup. The deposition of Mubarak has not weakened but strengthened the regime. The U.S. is not have lost, because they played more on tables, supporting all the forces at work in Egypt. Well, almost. The unknown and the Muslim Brotherhood, "turkish scenario."
Twenty-four hours after the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, a major European broadcaster has had the courage of its holder as a service: "For the first time in thirty years, Egypt finds democracy." Customers who bought this title must have a very original idea of \u200b\u200b"democracy." As Mubarak was an authoritarian despot, the elections a farce, the constitution rejected by the emergency laws in force for decades, what happened in Egypt in recent days, in fact this: that an elected president has been replaced by a military junta, dissolved the parliament and the constitution suspended. This is not democracy, is (still) a military dictatorship. And so that was not in Egypt, for now, a revolution - as many, including "Wikipedia", s'ostinano to call it - but a military coup. a coup that will change many things, but certainly not subvert nor revolutionary Egypt. Why Egypt is a military regime after the Revolution of 1952. Even that was a military coup, in reality, but it deserves the name of revolution, perché depose un monarca e varò una repubblica ispirata ai valori del socialismo, del panarabismo e dell’anti-imperialismo. Nasser incarnò questi valori, i suoi successori li abbandonarono. Sadat abbandonò la lotta a Israele e s’allineò agli USA, inaugurò quel processo, poi portato a compimento da Mubarak, di privatizzazione dell’economia in linea coi dettami neo-liberali del Washington Consensus. Ma se sono cambiati i contenuti, non è cambiata la forma. Sadat e Mubarak giunsero alla presidenza da alti ufficiali militari, ed in questi sessant’anni le Forze Armate hanno acquisito un enorme potere in Egitto, non solo a livello politico ma anche economico. Le FF.AA. egiziane 'm kind of a holding company that controls large sectors of the economy, and not by virtue of their strategic value, but the potential for profit. The Egyptian military lands, buildings - including resort in Sharm ash-Shaikh - and industrial plants that produce olive oil from household appliances.
Hosni Mubarak, now seriously ill and eighty (news reports say that it would now end of life), made no secret to aspire to the succession of his son Gamal in power. The prospect of Gamal Mubarak to become the next president - and thus despot - Egypt did not like the military, and for two reasons. The first is Mubarak Jr. is not one of them, has never served in the Armed Forces, and his ascent to the summit of the state would mean the end of military rule, to the benefit of a family system or, at least, d ' a power system centered on the National Democratic Party (founded by Sadat and then Mubarak monopolized by the family). The second is that Gamal Mubarak, tied hand in glove to finance the Anglo-Saxon, was the director of the privatization cycle that has characterized the Egyptian economy in recent years. Privatization, of course, threaten the financial-industrial empire of the Egyptian Armed Forces. The clan
Mubarak was hated for many good reasons, even by most of the Egyptians (as the same election, even fraudulent, the 2005 show, where the PND emerged defeated by almost all the few seats where it was allowed to stand in real opposition). Mubarak continued, like its predecessors, trampled on the civil liberties of the Egyptians, and held up his government on brute force and repression. Pan-Arab has betrayed the ideals and the sense of solidarity between Muslims clutching an informal alliance with Israel, much to abet the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip. Ha, finally, destroyed, or allowed the destruction of the Egyptian economy. The country that Nasser was launched on path of development, and that in the 70s was at the level of the most prosperous economies in Asia (of course excluding Japan), since the 80s has seen a steady decline in parallel with the neo-liberal reforms. The demolition of the social security system has worsened the living standards of the lower classes. Does anyone (especially the Mubarak family) has accumulated enormous wealth, but most were impoverished.
The growing hostility within the Armed Forces met with hatred rooted in the population. Just a spark to explode the situation, and this spark was represented by the success (even, in truth, partial) insurrection of Tunisia, with the flight of President Ben Ali. People took courage and took to the streets, before the Liberals and then gl'islamisti to reach a mass impact that the police, loyal to President Mubarak, was unable to contain. When the crowd overpowered the police took to the streets the Army. The scenes of jubilation of the people in front of tanks in the streets, the fact that soldiers have arrested several police squads and pro-Mubarak protesters anti-Mubarak, show the community of purpose - at least in the short term - between population and military : Both Mubarak wanted to leave. I militari senza fretta: una transizione progressiva era la soluzione preferita, l’importante era che il potere non finisse a Gamal Mubarak ma ritornasse in seno alle Forze Armate, perché esprimessero un nuovo presidente tratto dalle loro fila. Forse proprio quel Omar Suleiman che il Presidente aveva nominato suo vice; quel Suleiman già capo della polizia politica e dei torturatori del regime, intimo di Washington e Tel Aviv. Il popolo, invece, più impazientemente ha spinto sull’acceleratore, chiedendo l’immediato abbandono di Mubarak. Una volta verificato che non c’era modo di calmare la piazza, i militari hanno chiesto a Mubarak di farsi da parte. Il 10 febbraio si sparse la voce che il Presidente si sarebbe dimesso: lo stesso Leon Panetta, direttore della CIA, lo anticipò al Congresso. Con grande sorpresa di molti, la sera del 10 Mubarak, nel suo ultimo discorso trasmesso in televisione, non rinunciò alla carica. L’11 non poteva che essere il giorno decisivo. I manifestanti erano decisi a marciare sul palazzo presidenziale, e l’Esercito aveva poche opzioni: difendere Mubarak sparando sulla folla, e così spezzando la “luna di miele” tra popolo e militari; lasciare che il popolo deponesse con le proprie mani il Presidente, concedendo così un pericoloso spazio di “sovranità popolare”; risolvere la situazione deponendo personalmente Mubarak and taking full powers. Predictably, they chose the latter option.
The U.S. has openly pressed for such a solution. In fact, Mubarak was defended by very few countries, among which, in addition to Saudi Arabia and some other Arab tyranny, Israel and Italy. Others, like China, have been limited to condemn foreign interference as "foreign hand" that Mubarak has mentioned in his last speech. In fact, Washington is not out defeat by the "Egyptian Revolution," and what it has wisely been able to play at multiple tables. Hosni Mubarak has consistently argued, diplomaticamente, economicamente, e con la consulenza della CIA in materia di repressione del dissenso, nel corso dei trent’anni in cui ha tiranneggiato l’Egitto. La grande finanza anglosassone ha cooptato e manovrato Gamal Mubarak, regista delle privatizzazioni e, fino a pochi giorni fa, probabile successore del padre alla Presidenza. Nel frattempo, la Casa Bianca, le Forze Armate statunitensi e la CIA hanno coltivato i rapporti coi vertici militari del paese arabo, prestando loro armi e consulenza (pochi giorni prima del golpe, i più alti ufficiali egiziani erano riuniti a Washington per consultazioni col Pentagono). Infine, organizzazioni “non governative” e para-governative degli USA (Like the NED) for some years have infiltrated the civil society and opposition to the regime (see also the recent article by V. Maddaloni on this site). Washington, in short, is shielded in order to succeed in winning any case: simply focusing on all the horses in the race. Well, almost.
Almost, because there are unknowns in the equation in Egypt. Unknowns that Washington has certainly expected, but has not yet succeeded in controlling. In Egypt there are only two great mass movements, real power centers of potential alternatives to the armed forces: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Coptic Church. If it is to separate the religion, to join us is the common hostility toward the military regime. It is perhaps no coincidence that, just weeks before the coup, deadly attacks have sparked the ire of the Copts against the regime and gl'islamisti. Behind the attacks which, according to Egyptian authorities, there would be an unspecified "foreign hands" willing to destabilize Egypt - the same foreign hand which Mubarak has spoken in his last speech as president?
The Muslim Brotherhood Mubarak have lived with a very special relationship. Bitter enemies, however, have developed a kind of symbiosis. Nasser was the main persecutor of the Brotherhood: forced Naguib, the first president, to stand by just with the charge of excessive indulgence towards gl'islamisti, and in the name of "secularism" (Muslim secularism is certainly very different from that of Europe, as evidenced by the continual references to the legitimacy and the support from the divine part of the same secular rulers of Arab countries) and nationalism them brutally repressed. On the other hand, Nasser was a charismatic leader and idealistic, genuinely loved by his people, the same is not true successors. Below them, the Brotherhood has begun to flourish, finding a modus vivendi with Mubarak: in exchange for taking away from armed struggle (carried out by other Islamist fringes) and a sort of "withdrawal" election, the regime has granted more leeway to the Islamist movement. The Muslim Brotherhood decided to regain the Egyptian society from below, seducing the hearts and minds of the population by offering its own system of protections and social services. This strategy has had more success because it put in place alongside the dismantling of the welfare state implemented by Hosni Mubarak and his son - and Mubarak has tolerated Muslim Brotherhood because the services have replaced those of the State, thus neutralizing the negative social consequences that could overwhelm the system. In many parts of Egypt, including Cairo, health "public" is actually represented by the health network of the Brotherhood. The U.S. role in orchestrating the protests and the military, and the modus vivendi found with even hated Mubarak, explaining the initial hesitancy of the Muslim Brotherhood to take part in the revolt. The decision not to nominate his men for the Presidency of the country can reflect both the suspicion of a "revolution" hetero-directed from abroad and from the system itself and the desire to avoid hurting the military, to avoid further escalation of repression and forward to continuing the long-term strategy based on winning company before power. But the actual behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in the weeks and months ahead is the great unknown of upheavals Egyptians. Adopt a conservative strategy? The contacts with Saudi Arabia and the authentic capital of Islamic extremism that is London will cause you to an attitude of cooperation with the Atlantic? Or, will try to exploit the favorable moment to force events and create its own, a true revolution?
this is certainly the hope degl'Iraniani. It is true that Shia Iran has often had problems with the array of Sunni Islam (think the Taliban or Wahhabi Saudi Arabia), but the reports could not be worse than with the current military regime. The interwoven relationship with Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, demonstrate that dialogue and cooperation are possible. However, the triumphant tones used in the last days dagl'Iraniani - who claim to see events in a repeat of their Egyptian Revolution - are exaggerated. A little 'sincere exaltation (the combination of events with the anniversary of the Egyptian Islamic Revolution - an event keenly felt in Iran, certainly far more than the sesquicentennial of the Unit here by us) in a season massive dose of propaganda and wishful thinking. Do the same, after all, the U.S. and the media controlled by them: the anti-US slogans and anti-Zionist protesters have disappeared from newspaper reports, the Muslim Brotherhood is snobbishly considered a minority in the country, all the merit of the revolt is assigned to the local liberal faction. The Western press extols the virtues of those great revolutionary tools that would be Facebook and Twitter, but the fact is that the streets are indeed filled Egyptian after the scheme had blocked Internet, and to fill them was the Muslim Brotherhood, with its religious message and the direct link it has with the population. People are ready to die for who gives him food, health, jobs and hope, not for who's "Tweet" some idealistic slogans and xenophilous.
But then, if the Muslim Brotherhood should not intervene to disrupt the tables, what really changed in Egypt and the Near East? In Egypt, the military regime appears more solid than before: the deposition of the Mubarak has strengthened, not weakened. It is possible that, thanks to U.S. pressure, is reached to establish a semblance of liberal democracy, but in fact the power will remain in the hands of the military and Egypt is a sovereign country to control. Obama, without the bombastic proclamations and wars Bush is seeking more than him in the street for the "democratization" of the "Greater Middle East", ie the replacement of old with a new generation of dictators, despots, maybe oligarchies ensuring more space for freedom for their people, but does not allow which puts into question the neoliberal dogma and Atlanticist. It is an ambitious project and learning sorcerer could lose control of the forces raised with his sorcery. The people of the region do not eat friendly feelings towards the U.S. and Israel, and then mobilize to overthrow governments and to try to co-opt the power system Atlanticist is a big risk: Hence the unease with which Tel Aviv is going through these events, also mindful of the ever more tragic (for her) turkish experiment. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt, the electoral victories of Hamas in Palestine and the AKP in Turkey, Hezbollah's success against the attempted Israeli invasion of Lebanon, are all events that are changing the mindset of the people of the area. After decades, even centuries, of helplessness and defeat, something seems to be changing. I understand that local people can decide their own destiny.
Iran and the U.S. try to pull the blanket of Arab upheavals everyone towards you. Tehran dreams of many Hamas and Hezbollah that they take il potere nei paesi arabi, Washington lavora per regimi più “moderni” e presentabili, ma ancor più docili e sottomessi. Ma se tra i due litiganti a godere fosse il terzo? La Turchia, che ormai si configura come un paese sia islamista sia liberal-democratico, potrebbe essere il modello mediano su cui assestarsi per i lacerati paesi arabi. E che gran sorpresa sarebbe, se non lo sguardo severo di Khomeini e neppure la “icona pop” Obama, bensì il compassato e moderato Erdoğan, dovesse affermarsi come il faro che guida le masse arabe verso una nuova epoca.
* Daniele Scalea, redattore di “Eurasia”, è autore de La sfida totale (Fuoco, Roma 2010).
http://www.italiasociale.net/alzozero11/az170211-1.html
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